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Seeing Like a Standard 
 
Abstract 
Biofuels have expanded across the globe, generating a range of concerns in the 
places of production. One approach to controlling the effects of biofuel production 
has been sustainability standards. This article takes a ‘seeing like’ approach to 
analyse how the EU Sustainability standard contributes to narrowing the vision of 
what sustainable biofuels are. Six biofuel cases in Africa are examined through the 
lens of the standard, using remote sensing to investigate the criteria on land use and 
canopy cover change. The standard view is also compared to on ground views 
regarding the sustainability of the projects. The effects of seeing like the EU 
standard are two: 1) diluted seeing, which prioritises global environmental 
problems over more nuanced social and institutional aspects; and 2) distributed 
seeing, which transforms standardised sustainable biofuels into multiple, uncertain 
forms because of hybrid governance. High carbon losses due to biofuel projects 
were detected, but at the same time, the standard simplifies and skips over wider 
problems related to unsustainable biofuel projects. 
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Introduction 
How do standards ‘see’ sustainable biofuels? By ‘seeing like a standard’, 
this article seeks to expand our knowledge of how standards diffuse the meaning of 
sustainable biofuels. The idea that standards are necessary for sustainable biofuels 
emerged as a range of concerns related to biofuel crop production emerged in the 
early 2000’s, such as problematic land use changes leading to deforestation, loss of 
biodiversity, carbon emissions, displacements, food insecurity, and so forth. A 
large number sustainability standards and certification schemes were launched to 
enable states and other actors to ‘see’ and control the impacts of biofuel production 
(Scarlat and Dallemand, 2011). This is how many see sustainable biofuels today, 
through a standard grid that makes legible biofuel plantations in faraway places.   
In this article, we take a ‘seeing like’ approach to understand the standard 
mode of governing, which draws on James Scott’s argument that the ability to 
govern relies on ‘seeing’ and making subjects legible for rule. In ‘Seeing like a 
state’ (1998), Scott details how states try to engineer societies, forests, agricultures 
and cities into standardised, bureaucratic realities, only to fail precisely because 
planners created a distorted picture of society and nature which distances 
themselves from local, interested, contextual, and historically specific realities. 
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Drawing on Scott, we probe the role of standards in making sustainable biofuel 
production legible for schematic knowledge and control; in short we attempt to 
look at biofuels through the lens of international standards in order to ‘see’ what 
the standard sees. By ‘seeing like a standard’, we can therefore increase our 
understanding of how criteria, control and verification contribute to narrowing our 
vision of what sustainable biofuels are.   
With this in mind, we decided to look closer at one of the meta-standards 
for sustainable biofuels, namely the standard of the European Union (EU). 
Beginning in the early 2000s, EU policymakers introduced targets for renewable 
energy in all forms of transport, and later added to these policies a set of mandatory 
sustainability criteria for biofuel crop production. These criteria were issued 
simultaneously through the Renewable Energy Directive (EU-RED) 2009/28/EC 
(Articles 17-19) and Fuel Quality Directive (EU-FQD) 2009/30/EC (Article 7b-d). 
This standard applies to biofuel and bioliquids sold within the EU, including 
biomaterial produced beyond the EU. By controlling the large EU market, the 
standard can partly govern the rules of global biofuel production (Di Lucia, 2010). 
The standard may therefore ‘orchestrate’ how sustainable biofuels are viewed and 
practiced globally (Schleifer, 2013). The standard is not innocent in this sense, as it 
aspires control at-a-distance. Our contribution is in understanding how the standard 
seeks to sanction, permit and create a particular form of sustainable biofuels, which 
justifies specific values, authorities, expertise, and technologies, while blocking out 
others. 
In this article, we ask what the EU ‘sees’ through the standard, and what it 
misses seeing, given that standards are not all-seeing but quite selective in their 
view. Whereas earlier studies have shown that the standard offers an EU-centric 
and partial definition of sustainability, leaving issues such as livelihoods, equity, 
water and rural development aside (Franco et al., 2010; Hunsberger et al., 2013; 
Larsen et al., 2013; Levidow, 2013), few have extended the analysis to ask how the 
EU has codified ‘sustainable biofuels’ into a legible and administratively more 
convenient format that allows greater control of biofuels as a whole. In part one; 
we therefore identify the criteria through which sustainable biofuels are read. We 
find that sustainable biofuel production has been made intelligible through a grid of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) and land use change (LUC), and we discuss the reasons 
behind this simplified rendering and the control mechanisms. Given the focus on 
LUC, it is noteworthy that earlier research has been doubtful to the efficiency of 
standards to control LUC (Pavlovskaia, 2014).  
In part two, we investigate how the LUC criteria can be controlled, 
primarily through ‘remote seeing’ and specifically how the criterion on canopy 
cover change (CCC) is assessed using Earth Observation (EO) and Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS). The CCC criterion is central to the standard as it 
benchmarks the maximum forest crown cover which can be cleared for sustainable 
biofuel production. We examine the degree of CCC in six biofuel cases, namely for 
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plantations of the oil crop Jatropha curcas L. located within or near Miombo 
woodlands and coastal forests in Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya. 
Moreover, in our attempt to understand the standard optic and what is missed, we 
briefly explore on the ground views regarding the sustainability of the projects, by 
analysing media, civil society reports, official impact assessments, and interviews 
with local residents. Indeed, some have argued that high environmental standards 
have to a certain degree legitimised land acquisitions, later critiqued as ‘land 
grabbing’ and ‘green grabbing’ (Borras and Franco, 2012; Fairhead et al., 2012). 
Standards fuse in these ways into the wider governance by government agencies at 
local, state and union levels, private sustainability schemes, international 
organisations, NGOs, and economic operators.  
In our research, we find that the standard mode of governing has moved 
beyond Scott’s state-centric conceptualisation. Indeed, Scott’s ‘seeing like’ 
approach has been used extensively to explain the optics of governance beyond the 
state (Bridge, 2014), to examine the powers of private, non-governmental and 
international organisations and their technical devices of measurement, calculation 
and visualization (Broome and Seabrooke, 2012; Ferguson, 2005; Li, 2005; 
MacEachern, 2010; Schuller, 2007). Standards are part of a broader hybridisation 
of power, in which public and private authorities actively interact (Ponte et al., 
2011b). Seeing like the EU standard resembles this diffusion of power, which both 
enables and constrains EU to ‘see’ beyond its borders. In our analysis, the effects 
of seeing like the EU standard are two: 1) diluted seeing, which prioritises global 
environmental problems, GHG emissions and biodiversity loss over more nuanced 
social and institutional aspects; and 2) distributed seeing, which transforms 
standardised sustainable biofuels into multiple, uncertain forms because of hybrid 
governance. In this view, we detected high carbon losses due to biofuel projects, 
but at the same time, the standard simplifies and skips over wider problems related 
to unsustainable projects. 
Seeing like a standard: EU and its sustainability criteria for biofuels 
Diluted seeing 
A key argument within the ‘seeing like’ literature is that knowledge and 
control require a simplified, narrowing of vision, that is, to bring into ‘sharp focus 
certain limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality’ 
(Scott, 1998, 11). The literature on standards, audit and verification follow this 
logic to argue that the standard apparatus (its construction, content, form, shape, 
and technologies) reduces matters into simplified forms. On the one hand, 
standards can make sustainable biofuels legible by bringing into view critical 
matters of concern. On the other hand, standards are often criticised for using 
‘universal’ and ‘science-based’ criteria and indicators to represent reality as 
qualitatively and quantitatively homogeneous (Power, 1997; Strathern, 2000). 
Standards also tend to require responses to be classified as ‘neutral’, ‘quantifiable’, 
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and ‘epistemologically objective’ (Fortin and Richardson, 2013; Jensen and 
Winthereik, 2013, 121-46). Seeing like a standard is performative in this way, as 
the optic requires reproducing the world through a narrow syntax. In Scott’s terms, 
‘a selective reality is achieved’ (1998, 11). This is what we call a diluted view. 
Values are reduced. Meanings are thinned out. 
For the EU standard, this dilution has worked in favour of global 
environmental values. A main criterion of the standard pertains to the GHG 
emissions savings, which must exceed 35% when compared to fossil fuel emissions 
(the savings minimum increased to 50% in 2017). The GHG criterion is tied to 
restrictions on LUC. The assumption is that if land with high stocks of carbon in its 
soil or vegetation is converted for the cultivation of raw materials for biofuels or 
bioliquids, some of the stored carbon will be released into the atmosphere and thus 
‘offset the positive greenhouse gas impact of the biofuels, and its ability to combat 
climate change’ (RED Item 70). The standard therefore includes various criteria for 
controlling LUC, including disqualifying any biofuel sources produced from land 
that is ‘highly biodiverse’, ‘primary forest’, and ‘continuously forested’. The EU 
sets the benchmark values for land use change in accordance with the status of the 
land after January 2008. In practice, this means that changes are attributed to 
biofuel operations irrespective of the actual cause. Table 1 summarises the criteria 
that carves out sustainable from unsustainable land use for biofuel production. 
These include quantitative criteria which accounts for carbon in terms of canopy 
cover change, hectares and height of trees, and qualitative criteria which make 
legible biodiversity values.  
The standard has thinned out complex local, environmental and social 
aspects within the compliance process to mere reporting on ‘social sustainability’. 
Social aspects are used as an umbrella term for social, economic and environmental 
dimensions that have implications for the well-being of local residents, such as 
labour rights, land and resource rights, community participation and consent in land 
acquisition processes, human rights, food security, livelihood impacts and 
contributions to rural development, gender-differentiated impacts (German and 
Schoneveld, 2012). None of these issues were translated into criteria. Rather, the 
Commission is required every two years to report the impact on social 
sustainability in EU and in third countries, specifically ‘on the availability of 
foodstuffs at affordable prices, in particular for people living in developing 
countries, and wider development issues’ (EU-RED 17:7; EU-FQD 7b:7). The 
report shall address the respect of land use rights, and whether countries that 
produce biofuels have ratified and implemented a number of Conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) concerning forced labour, child labour, 
discrimination, the right to organize, and equal pay for women and men. However, 
to report whether conventions have been implemented is not the same as requiring 
that their principles are being practiced. This dilutes the social responsibility of the 
EU.  
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Others have also found that the meaning of sustainable biofuel production 
has been watered down. Larsen et al. (2013) concluded that the standard is ‘water 
blind’ as it gives no consideration of water resources in the locale of biofuel 
production. A case-study of the standard in Indonesia found that it ignored issues 
of accountability and ‘the intrinsic exploitative dynamics of large-scale 
agroindustry’ (p.303). Others have also questioned the assumptions behind EU-
RED (Franco et al., 2010; Hunsberger et al., 2013; Levidow, 2013). Hunsberger et 
al. (2013) has noted that issues such as income, food security, access or control 
over land and resources, social inclusion, and gender have been marginalised in 
biofuel policies, and the question of whether engaging in biofuel production is a 
sustainable option has been largely ignored. In reference to EU-RED, Levidow 
(2013) argued that the controversy over harmful changes in land use has been 
reduced to efforts at accounting for carbon, while disregarding other environmental 
harm and obscuring people’s experiences of harm and dispossession. Levidow 
concluded that carbon accounting is used to depoliticise such harmful changes by 
framing natural resources as qualitatively homogeneous and quantitatively 
comparable.  
It is remarkable that EU has not moved far from Scott’s (1998) account of 
the creation of the ‘scientific forest’. To a large degree, an actual tree with its vast 
number of possible uses has been replaced by an abstract tree representing carbon 
stock. Like the state in Scott’s parable, the EU has ignored ‘the vast, complex, and 
negotiated social uses of the forest for hunting and gathering, pasturage, fishing, 
charcoal making, trapping, and collecting food and valuable minerals as well as the 
forest’s significance for magic, worship, refuge, and so on’. Missing is ‘nearly 
everything touching on human interaction with the forest’ (p.13).  
The failure to make these dimensions legible through the standard has not 
gone unnoticed. Global biofuel expansion has been widely criticised, specifically 
the way that expansion has been at the expense of forests and customary rights to 
land and resources, and corresponding displacement of traditional land use, food 
and livelihood systems (Dauvergne and Neville, 2010; Fargione et al., 2008; 
German et al., 2011b; Sulle and Nelson, 2009). These concerns are pertinent 
especially for poorer and vulnerable groups, for whom forests operate as a form of 
safety net, providing food and fuel for basic survival when other incomes are 
scarce (Dufey et al., 2007; IIASA, 2009; OECD, 2011; World Resources Report, 
2005). Indeed, the EU’s standardised optic seems contingent on the global 
institutionalised view of forests that prioritises deforestation and forest degradation 
related to biodiversity loss and climate change. From a governance perspective, the 
EU’s optic shifts from governments to the standards, and market-based certification 
and self-regulation by market actors (Arts and Buizer, 2009). 
There are various reasons for this diluted optic. A working document by the 
Commission recommended excluding social and food security criteria due to their 
lack of feasibility, WTO compatibility and significance (German and Schoneveld, 
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2012, 767). Specifically, to attribute social impacts to precise locations and 
operations was deemed unfeasible. The issue of food security was instead related to 
global agricultural markets, and other social issues were too contingent upon 
national legislation and enforcement. Others have also shown that the deliberations 
were influenced by fears that social considerations would result in World Trade 
Table 1: EU’s land use criteria, based on EU-RED Article 17 and EU-FQD Article 
7b 
 
Organization disputes (Ackrill and Kay, 2011). Since protectionism is prohibited, it 
is thought that only environmental issues acknowledged by international 
conventions, such as climate change mitigation and biodiversity protection, can be 
allowed as criteria, even if they produce trade barriers (Di Lucia, 2010).  
1. Biofuels/bioliquids cannot be produced from raw materials obtained from land with 
high biodiversity value. This includes land that had the following statuses in or after 
January 2008:  
(a) Primary forest and other wooded land, namely forest and other wooded land of 
native species, where there is no clearly visible indication of human activity and the 
ecological processes are not significantly disturbed. 
(b) Areas designated: (i) by law or by the relevant competent authority for nature 
protection purposes; or (ii) for the protection of rare, threatened or endangered 
ecosystems or species recognised by international agreements or included in lists 
drawn up by intergovernmental organisations or the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature. 
(c) Areas of highly biodiverse grassland that is: (i) natural, namely, grassland that would 
remain grassland in the absence of human intervention and which maintains the 
natural species composition and ecological characteristics and processes; or (ii) 
non-natural, namely, grassland that would cease to be grassland in the absence of 
human intervention and which is species-rich and not degraded, unless evidence is 
provided that the harvesting of the raw material is necessary to preserve its 
grassland status. 
2. Biofuels/bioliquids cannot be produced from raw materials obtained from land with 
high carbon stock. This includes land that had the following statuses in January 2008 
and no longer has that status:  
(a) wetlands, namely land that is covered with or saturated by water permanently or for 
a significant part of the year 
(b) Continuously forested areas, namely, land spanning more than one hectare with 
trees higher than five metres and a canopy cover of more than 30 %, or trees able to 
reach those thresholds in situ. (Our CCC criterion) 
(c) Land spanning more than one hectare with trees higher than five metres and a 
canopy cover of between 10 % and 30 %, or trees able to reach those thresholds in 
situ, unless it can be proven that greenhouse gas emission reduction targets can still 
be achieved following conversion. 
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However, as German and Schoneveld (2012, 767) note, it remains unclear 
why it is considered highly feasible to link biodiversity to specific operations, but 
not social impacts. The widespread legislation and use of Environmental, Social 
and Health Impact Assessment (EIA, EISA, ESHIA) methodologies is one 
indication that social issues can be made legible at project level using current 
globally accepted techniques. Moreover, international conventions are increasingly 
translated into corporate guidelines which require the respect of human rights, 
customary land rights and food security when introducing large-scale land projects, 
indicating that standards can at least in part ‘see’ these social dimensions in other 
contexts. 
The EU standard also fails to engage with indirect land use change (ILUC). 
The position of the EU has been that ILUC should not be included as a 
sustainability requirement in any of the reporting methodologies because it is 
difficult to calculate, predict and validate (European Commission, 2010). A number 
of uncertainties associated with the modelling of ILUC have long undermined any 
scientific and political consensus over how to quantify and attribute ILUC to 
individual biofuel operators and the industry at large (Levidow, 2013; Liska and 
Perrin, 2009). However, the EU has increasingly recognised that ILUC occurs 
where pasture or agricultural land previously destined for food and feed markets is 
diverted to biofuel production, because ‘the non-fuel demand will still need to be 
satisfied either through intensification of current production or by bringing non-
agricultural land into production elsewhere’ (EU, 2015, (4)). Given that current 
biofuels are mainly produced from crops grown on existing agricultural land, the 
EU has put a cap on total food crops used to produce biofuels and has reviewed the 
possibilities for making ILUC legible within the standard (EU, 2015). This 
illustrates the continuous process of making complex issues legible for simple 
control and administration. 
Summing up, this section has shown how sustainability concerns are 
distilled and simplified; matters of societal concern are reduced to concerns for the 
EU and economic actors, particularly by enrolling trade rationales and scientific 
controversies into the definition of sustainable biofuels. We have therefore already 
begun to see how the standard was not developed freely within a grid of European 
objectives; instead, the power to define the criteria was distributed across global 
actors, and through this type of distributed seeing, social responsibilities could be 
traded away. The next section further develops this notion of distributed seeing. 
Distributed seeing 
The EU standard distributes power in various ways. Apart from the influence of 
trade organisations, the EU has invited various authorities to co-define its criteria. 
Producer states may claim a stake, because the standard excludes areas that are 
protected for nature purposes as designated by law or the relevant authority in the 
country of production. The standard also excludes areas that are hosting rare, 
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threatened or endangered ecosystems and species, but only when recognised by 
international agreements or included in lists drawn up by intergovernmental 
organisations or the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 
Other global authorities such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO) are invited to define the type of ‘primary forest’ that cannot 
be deforested. This includes areas where collection of non-wood forest products 
occurs, provided the human impact is small. Other types of forests as defined by 
the FAO, such as modified natural forests, semi-natural forests, and plantations, 
should not be considered as primary forests (EU-RED Preamble Item 69; EU-FQD 
Item 11).  
The diffused nature of governance comes to view here, as the coding 
process is drawn into the daily work and negotiations among these authorities. 
What is sustainable or not relies upon the efforts of international organisations to 
ensure that areas deemed worth protecting are properly mapped out and protected 
within clear boundaries. Such tasks may not have been picked up yet by these 
organisations, which means that some forests or areas with biodiversity might be 
more valued than others across different places targeted for biofuel production. The 
‘neutral’, ‘quantifiable’, and ‘epistemologically objective’ stance of the standard 
view has begun to wither. 
Moreover, the EU distributes power by outsourcing the control and 
verification mechanisms for standard compliance (EU-RED Art.18; EU-FQD 
Art.7c). (See figure 1 for an overview.) The EU emphasis is primarily on member 
states, which ‘sees’ that states implement and fulfil the standard. Member states 
should in turn organise national systems that control how biofuels are counted in 
order to fulfil national binding targets. Member states can implement the standard 
in national legislation, and allow biofuel operators to demonstrate compliance by 
becoming certified through recognised private sustainability schemes. The 
Commission has so far approved 19 private schemes, which have been developed 
by various constellations of business alliances, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), international organisations (IOs), and governmental agencies (European 
Commission, 2016). These private schemes should include the standard 
requirements, but they can also vary greatly both in their general system 
requirements, and in their environmental and social criteria (German and 
Schoneveld, 2012). Research suggests that those merely mirroring the EU criteria, 
the most commercially-oriented, top-down and global North-focused biofuel 
certification schemes, were fast to monopolize the market, thus closing off the 
expansion of more inclusive and transparent certification systems (Ponte, 2014). In 
addition, this distributed mode of governing relies heavily on self-control by each 
company for providing evidence to auditors.  
The EU attempts to govern sustainable biofuels at the global scale are not 
unlike how international organisations ‘see’ and influence member states (cf. 
Broome and Seabrooke, 2012; Sharman, 2012). In addition to using one of the EU-
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approved schemes and enrolling the services of private auditing firms, operators 
can also show compliance by operating under bilateral and multilateral agreements 
between governments, which confirm compliance with some or all of the 
sustainability criteria. The EU has already approved an agreement with Australia 
(European Commission, 2016) and the United States has made petitioned to 
recognize US environmental protection laws as a proxy for the EU standard 
(German and Schoneveld, 2012). How these agreements come about is not well 
documented. Research indicates that the standard can influence third country 
legislation in more indirect and market-driven ways (Di Lucia, 2010). For example, 
the biofuel sector in Mozambique was developed in line with the EU sustainability 
criteria to potentially meet the requirement of the EU market (Schut et al., 2014). 
These circumstances suggest that the EU standard can influence standardisation 
more widely. Despite its blind spots, the EU’s standard is more stringent than many 
other global attempts at governing biofuels. It is thus hopeful that the EU’s ‘seeing’ 
can persuade other states (and non-state actors) to adopt, implement and sustain 
these standards over time. 
There are several important consequences of market involvement in this 
quasi-state, hybrid governance arrangement. First, approved schemes must only 
cover the environmental criteria, and evidence suggests that few biofuel operators 
opt for schemes that have gone beyond the standard to also ‘see’ social issues such 
as labour, land and food rights (German and Schoneveld, 2011; Schleifer, 2013). 
Certain schemes might also be preferred due to verification procedures, as some 
rely primarily on field audits while others make extensive use of self-declaration or 
desk audits (Schleifer, 2013, 541). While these simplified schemes can help to 
lower costs, they can also open up to fraud as the conduct of biofuel operators, 
independent auditors and representatives of sustainability standards are not 
necessarily neutral actions and can be influenced by profit making motives 
(Pavlovskaia, 2014, 105). The use of different mechanisms to ensure compliance to 
the same sustainability criterion can therefore lead to ‘uncertainty, local differences 
in the achieved results and insecurity’ (ibid.). The distributed nature of the 
compliance system, which extends over various private standards and audit bodies, 
increases the multiple ways that ‘sustainable biofuels’ can be seen.  
The ways that sustainable biofuels can be seen is distributed further if we 
return to the EU’s rationale to side-step social aspects. The EU assumed that issues 
such as labour rights, chemical use, and pollution can be left aside, as they are 
governed by other regulations. For example, biofuel feedstock produced within the 
EU must comply with its environmental and social requirements for agriculture. 
However, this legislation is restricted to the EU jurisdiction, and the EU has also 
recognised ‘that production of biofuels and bioliquids in certain third countries 
might not respect minimum environmental or social requirements’ (EU-RED 74). 
The administrative grid that the EU assumes the standard can hook onto is often 
lacking. Poor local law enforcement, underdeveloped policy measures and absence 
of infrastructure can therefore lead to very different outcomes, depending on the 
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place of production (Pavlovskaia, 2014, 105). There are of course legal 
jurisdictional reasons why the EU cannot simply expand its grid across the world. 
There are various reasons why the EU has adopted this distributed mode of 
governance. The adoption of a more traditional ‘command-and-control approach’ 
would have required considerably more time and public resources; costs which 
instead have been passed onto private schemes and biofuel operators (Schleifer, 
2013, 540). Indeed, the EU uses satellite imagery for overseeing the 
implementation of its agricultural policy, but to extend this remote seeing to 
outside the EU has been considered merely hypothetical. Other control 
mechanisms, such as aerial photographs, maps, data registers on land use, 
acquisition and farming processes, and regular field surveys, would require 
significant technical knowledge and expertise, with substantial economic and 
administrative costs (Pavlovskaia, 2014, 98-99). These costs and challenges do not 
disappear but they are now distributed onto the ‘private governors’ along the 
biofuel chain. 
Nonetheless, according to Schleifer (2013), the Commission, member 
states, lobbyists and international organisations actively supported, facilitated, and 
embraced the governance arrangement using private schemes. Seeing like the EU, 
it allowed the Commission to ‘orchestrate’ emerging biofuel standards and 
certification bodies; yet, seeing like corporations, it gave industry power to shape 
what biofuel governance was becoming. Some schemes already existed when the 
standard was negotiated, and these were used to block out outlying issues 
(Schleifer, 2013). This connects to the wider literature on biofuel standards and 
certification, which collectively question whether these can successfully govern 
‘sustainable biofuels’, given that they are highly influenced by market interests, 
technical language, and weak in terms of legitimacy and enforcement (Diaz-
Chavez, 2011; Elgert, 2012; Fortin and Richardson, 2013; Levidow, 2013; Ponte, 
2014; Schouten et al., 2012). 
The ability of actors to orchestrate rules is also managed through the 
standard view. The approach to use voluntary standards reduces the possibility of 
coming into conflict with the WTO rules. Technical regulations are commonly 
regarded as nontariff trade barriers and discriminatory treatment of imported 
products, whereas the requirements of voluntary sustainability standards ‘do not 
normally contradict international trade rules’ (Pavlovskaia, 2014, 103). In contrast 
to cross-border inspections through the EU or its member states, private auditing 
companies are unconstrained by national borders and able to monitor compliance in 
the industry’s transnational production networks (Schleifer, 2013). This makes the 
diffusion of the EU-centric standard beyond EU borders possible. Seeing like a 
state-led standard on other states’ territories is indeed a delicate endeavour.  
Taken together, the EU approach has been described as a new form of 
establishing control through an increasingly hybrid, network mode of governance 
combining binding regulations for the member states, private and self-governed 
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sustainability standards, and growing reliance on independent auditors (Bailis and 
Baka, 2011; Pavlovskaia, 2014). It therefore reaches beyond what has been called 
‘distributed public governance’ which is concerned with the protection of the 
public interest in an increasingly wide variety of government organisational forms, 
such as agencies, authorities and other government bodies (OECD, 2002). The EU 
approach extends to what Swyngedouw (2005) terms ‘governance beyond the 
state’, but it is not simply a process of deregulation. Rather, it is a re-articulated, 
negotiated and less hierarchal form of governance (Ponte et al., 2011b). Borrowing 
from Foucault, the EU approach also stretches ‘governmentality beyond borders’ 
(Larner and Walters, 2004), or brings about ‘transnational governmentality’ 
(Ferguson and Gupta, 2002). Drawing on Ferguson, it implies that the work of 
government ‘does not unfold within a national grid; it is, instead, spread across a 
patchwork of transnationally networked bits’ (Ferguson, 2005, 380).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Various options for verification of compliance with the EU 
sustainability criteria 
The seeing and governmentality approach to standards go hand in hand, as they 
both address the two dimensions of governing, namely the thought (the political 
rationalities, principles, values and knowledge that frame the object of 
   EU Sustainability standard 
Criteria qualifications 
        (International organisations) 
Standard implementation 
               (28 EU member states) 
Independent 
auditing 
(EU criteria and 
guidelines) 
Certification 
schemes 
(19 approved) 
Bi/multilateral 
agreements 
(Australia) 
Sustainable biofuels in practice 
           (multiple forms) 
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governance), and the concrete process of governing (the technologies, tactics and 
tool used in governing) (Djama et al., 2011). Drawing on Science and Technology 
literature (Harbers, 2005), this involves the performative power of technologies, 
such as the satellite and GIS technologies that we employ in our case analysis. This 
means that the standard mode of governance becomes the property of networks 
rather than the product of a singular authority (cf. Spencer, 2010). In the next 
section, we take a pragmatic turn to see like the EU standard on six cases in Africa.  
Seeing like the EU standard on six jatropha projects in Africa 
To increase our understanding of how standards make sustainable biofuels 
legible, we now turn to ‘see like the EU standard’ on actual operations. Seeing like 
a standard implies that neither the Commission nor the member states or third 
states directly assess compliance. In line with its distributed seeing, the EU has 
extended this task to private certification bodies and independent auditors. To our 
knowledge, there has been no systemic investigation of the methods used by 
different auditors. The outcomes of different GHG accounting methods have 
generated some interest (Hennecke et al., 2013), but the LUC criteria remains a 
blind spot. A UK study found that companies had considerable challenges tracing 
their supply chain to identify previous land use (Chalmers and Archer, 2011). 
Remote sensing using Earth Observation (EO) and Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS) has been frequently proposed for these purposes (Gao et al., 2011; 
Scarlat and Dallemand, 2011). These are not the only options for establishing LUC, 
CCC and showing standard compliance, but remote sensing remains a strong 
competitor in the technologies of rule.  
Scientists have been quite forthcoming about the limitations of remote 
technologies both for the construction of historical baselines and for monitoring 
change in, for instance, forested areas. The lack of time series with sufficient 
temporal or spatial resolution, definitional disparities, and the complexities of 
establishing the social aspects of deforestation using quantitative data all serve to 
limit what can be ‘seen’ (Fitzherbert et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2011; Nalepa and 
Bauer, 2012; Skutsch et al., 2007; Wicke et al., 2011). Most studies have used 
remote sensing to establish the causal relation between biofuels and LUC on a 
global scale (Efroymson et al., 2016). Less attention has been given to the question 
of rendering LUC legible at plantation level (which is more difficult to capture 
through remote sensing) and in accordance with a standardised approach. These 
inadequacies are likely to be ‘black-boxed’ when brought into the standard 
apparatus aiming to generate simple answers. In our research, we were interested in 
opening up this black-box to discuss how remote technologies produce simplified 
images. In so doing, we also illustrate how knowledge and technologies for remote 
seeing contribute to the exercise of power. We begin this exercise by developing 
our methodology, then we analyse each of six cases, followed by a summarising 
discussion.  
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We selected biofuel projects that bring the issue of land use and 
deforestation into view, more specifically projects located within or near Miombo 
woodlands and coastal forests in Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya (see 
figure 2). The Miombo is considered an important sink for carbon, through both the 
standing- and below-ground biomass (Ryan et al., 2010; Walker and Desanker, 
2004; White et al., 2000). Locally, the area is culturally and economically valuable 
for the inhabitants, who diversify their livelihoods through charcoal production and 
the collection of traditional medicines, mushrooms, edible caterpillars, fuel wood, 
and building materials (Romijn, 2011; Sulle and Nelson, 2009). The area was 
selected because several EU companies were known to be clearing large areas for 
the production of jatropha, sugar cane, and oil palm at the time of this study 
(Anseeuw et al., 2012; Holden and Pagel, 2013; Hultman et al., 2012; Matondi et 
al., 2011; von Maltitz and Setzkorn, 2012). We have chosen to look at projects 
around the oil shrub Jatropha curcas L., as most biofuel investments were 
jatropha-based during the peak biofuel interest in the region (Anseeuw et al., 2012). 
Five of the companies (Kenya Jatropha Energy, D1 Oils-BP Fuel Crops, 
Moçamgalp, Sun Biofuels and BioShape) were partly owned by large EU-based 
companies. These were purposefully selected because they were developing 
industrial-scale projects for the EU market. Moçamgalp is a Portuguese-
Mozambican energy venture, which aimed to supply the Portuguese energy 
company Galp with biofuels for the EU market. Moçamgalp initiated several 
jatropha projects around Mozambique, and we focus on the project in the remote 
northern part of the country. Sun Biofuels was a UK-based biofuel company with 
jatropha projects in Tanzania and Mozambique, and we focus on the project in 
Tanzania. BioShape belonged to another EU-based energy company, namely the 
Dutch Eneco. The UK-based D1 Oils and the energy giant BP cooperated for a 
short period of time in order to produce jatropha biofuel for the UK and EU. Kenya 
Jatropha Energy was set up to supply the Italian-based energy company Nuove 
Iniziative Industriali (NII) with jatropha oil. These companies officially claimed 
that the EU standard would be met. Note that these companies prepared the land for 
jatropha production when the EU standard was under negotiation, but they would 
anyhow need to comply if they wished to sell their produce on the EU market for 
‘sustainable biofuels’. We included a sixth company with EU ties, which intended 
to meet a Mozambican standard instead (Niqel). To our knowledge, only Niqel is 
still intent on producing jatropha biofuels (see niqel.nl). 
Our primary methodological approach was to ‘see these projects like an EU 
standard’. We mixed natural and social scientific methods to give insight into how 
different methods and evidence convey different sustainability aspects. Our 
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analysis was orientated towards the LUC criteria (see Table 1).1 The GIS expert in 
our team developed a quantitative methodology for analysing LUC, more 
specifically for measuring CCC in and around the vicinity of the project areas. This 
method was used to assess the standard criterion on CCC. The CCC criterion states 
that biofuels and bioliquids cannot be produced from raw materials obtained from 
land with high carbon stock. This includes land that was continuously forested in 
January 2008 and no longer has this status, namely, land spanning more than one 
hectare with trees higher than five metres and a canopy cover of more than 30 %, 
or trees able to reach those thresholds in situ (EU-RED 17.4b and EU- FQD 7b.4b; 
see 2.b in Table 1). Qualitative data and methods were used for the following: to 
identify cases; to establish the location of the project and timing of project 
implementation; and to ground truth images whenever possible.  
Drawing on established techniques in remote sensing, three separate 
modules were used to establish CCC. First, we used Moderate Resolution Imaging 
Spectral-radiometer (MODIS) Vegetation Indices (MOD13Q1) data, and chose a 
16 day NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index) composite with spatial 
resolution of 250 meters (see Lunetta et al., 2006). Data from several seasons 
(times of the year) was compared to establish the optimum time to study CCC. 
Change over time was then identified manually and complemented by image 
analysis. This first module established the extent and time of CCC, which we used 
in the second module. The second module used high resolution data from the 
Landsat 5 and Landsat 7 satellites to measure LUC. Imagery from before and after 
CCC established the extent of the cleared area using manual delineation (mapping 
cleared areas manually in GIS programs). The third module established CCC in 
more detail, by using Very High Resolution (VHR) imagery available from Bing 
and Google. If imagery was available for the time before CCC, the canopy cover 
was established by a grid classification method (Axelson and Nilsson, 1993). 
Efforts were made here to code for changes at a higher resolution than 250 meters 
in order to capture plantation level data. We used a 50 x 50 meter grid and 
manually interpreted the occurrence of ground or canopy cover at the central point 
of each cell. If imagery was not available, the canopy cover was estimated using 
the best available High Resolution (HR) Landsat 5 or 7 imagery. Together these 
modules produced a digitalised representation of CCC for each of our six cases, 
which we used to see if land spanning more than one hectare with a canopy cover 
of more than 30 % was used for biofuel purposes. This type of averaging LUC 
from a distance circumscribes how we come to know LUC, as models are 
information-organising schemes which ‘see’ selective realities. Forested areas 
                                                
1 In our presentation of the results here, we try to balance between the needs of technical experts in 
very different fields for particular kinds of data and have endeavoured to translate technical terms 
for a wide audience. The citations point readers to more technical explanations. 
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smaller than the remotely sensed grid, poor images, and the inability to capture 
biodiversity or cultural and socio-economic forest values, all influence what is 
revealed from remote sensing (Nalepa and Bauer, 2012). Large-scale plantations 
can be seen, whereas small-scale production models are more difficult to trace from 
above, especially in contexts where farmers tend to integrate biofuel crops with 
other crops (German et al., 2011b). Remote sensing therefore skews what we can 
see, and data and imagery generated from remote sensing is one way to produce 
‘truth’ about LUC, among others (Nightingale, 2003). 
In order to triangulate for both convergence and divergence (Nightingale, 
2009), we sought to compare the remote sensed results to qualitative data. 
Qualitative methods were used to investigate other LUC criteria (biodiversity), and 
to see beyond the standard view onto alternative sustainability issues that had 
voiced about the projects. We drew mainly upon material collected from secondary 
sources, such as media and NGO reports. The availability of recorded material was 
not symmetrical, but depended on the degree of on-the-ground organisation, NGO 
interests, and so on that had investigated issues relating to the individual cases. 
Methods and dates of data collection therefore differed between the cases. Brief on-
ground observations and interviews with company representatives, state officials 
and NGO representatives were conducted for the Zambian and Mozambican cases. 
This ‘brief seeing’ was not ideal for understanding the wider question of 
sustainable land use. Yet for our purposes this seeing was productive as it mirrors 
the hasty working conditions of standard and certification auditors. The next 
section elaborates what seeing like a standard in this way conveys.  
 
Figure 2: Location of assessed biofuel projects in southern and eastern Africa: 1) 
Moçamgalp, 2) Niqel, 3) D1 Oils-BP Fuel Crops, 4) Sun Biofuels, 5) BioShape, 
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and 6) Kenya Jatropha Energy. The grey areas represent the distribution of 
Miombo woodlands (WWF, 2002).  
Case analysis: six jatropha operations 
Seeing like the EU standard on six cases in Africa reveals the value of the 
standardised approach. Paraphrasing Scott, its administrative power depends ‘on its 
abstract sketchiness, its lack of detail–its thinness’ (1998, 44). Through this diluted 
seeing, we detected that four out of six companies deforested land for jatropha 
production; in total 3102 hectares (ha) were cleared according to our remote 
sensing analysis, resulting in significant loss of carbon values. Moçamgalp, Niqel, 
and BioShape clearly violated the standard: the land originally had canopy cover of 
over 30% and LUC took place after the EU baseline (set January 2008).  
In the case of Moçamgalp in Lugela district, Mozambique, we observed this 
extensive deforestation, as we visited the project site during a field visit in 
November 6, 2011. A large area had been cleared, leaving the soil bare. Figure 3a 
shows the clearing equipment left at the site, and the size of the trees being cut 
down. Our CCC analysis showed that deforestation started in mid-2011 and 
reached over 547 ha. Figure 3b shows the digitalised, point form of our remote 
seeing. Our CCC method results in different shapes when the land is covered by 
tree crowns, bare land, or ‘no data’, that is, when our seeing is diffuse and when we 
lack data due to clouds, cloud shadows, or lack of VHR imagery. Through our 
different modules, we established that the estimated canopy cover had been 53% 
before the start of the clear felling. In this case, CCC was extensive and would not 
comply with the LUC criteria in the EU standard. High carbon values had been 
lost, which would disqualify the land for the production of sustainable biofuel 
under the EU standard.  
It is more difficult to trace back the loss of biodiversity, specifically if pre-
existing values have been lost. Using our remote lens, we are limited to on-line 
material and brief interviews with representatives of the company, local NGO and 
central government. Statements by the NGO indicate that further investigation 
would be needed to assess compliance with the biodiversity criterion of the 
standard in the Moçamgalp case. The NGO defined the cleared forest as having 
been ‘native’ with high ecological and cultural value for the local community 
(Oram, 2011). However, local NGOs have little say, as the standard requires that 
the forest has either been defined as a primary forest by the FAO, or otherwise 
worthy of protection because of rare, threatened or endangered ecosystems or 
species recognised by international agreements or included in lists drawn up by 
intergovernmental organisations or the IUCN. This shows how interlinked the 
standard view is to the work of international organisations like the FAO. We are 
not sure if the intent is for operators and auditors to consult these organisations 
proactively for an assessment, or more likely, that experts will be engaged to ‘see 
as’ these organisations by following standards set up for these purposes. 
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Interviews with a representative of the NGO during the field visit also 
suggested that the standard view was too simple. One issue was the legality of 
LUC. The NGO, together with the World Wide Fund  for Nature (WWF)-
Mozambique, questioned the legality of the land acquisition processes, and stated 
that there had been a lack of local consultation and environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) (Oram, 2011). These procedural aspects cannot be easily 
captured using a remote gaze. On the one hand, the company website stated that a 
5,000 ha lease had been granted. On the other hand, the project manager on the 
ground said that the local authorities had only issued a 100 ha trial permit (personal 
comm. November 3, 2011). If the latter is the case, deforestation of over 500 ha 
may have been done against the decision of local authorities, which would be 
problematic seeing that the company had requested 10,000-25,000 ha with 
immediate plans to clear 6,000 ha (ibid.).  
Our short visit did not suffice for interviews with local government, but it is 
noteworthy that a representative from Mozambique’s environmental ministry 
decided not to participate in the field visit. She said that these issues were under the 
responsibility of the local government and not the national ministry (personal 
comm. November 6, 2011). Seeing as a standard through the state was thus not 
very helpful, which highlights the problem of relying on distributed seeing. Within 
the EU, the standard can connect to other encoded and enforceable rules, whereas 
outside the EU this encoding and enforcement might or might not exist. The hybrid 
arrangement of governance partly manages this blind spot. Some of the qualifying 
schemes approved by the Commission have included legality criteria, such as the 
Roundtable for Sustainable Biomaterial. This means that the legality aspect is 
internalised in the certification apparatus, and that auditors should check for 
evidence of permits and procedures. However, since operators can choose schemes 
which merely mirror the EU’s diluted view, there will be differences in how 
sustainable biofuels are read, depending on the specifics of the hybrid arrangement 
in each case.  
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Figure 3: a) Photo showing the size of trees and clearing equipment. b) The extent 
of the Moçamgalp LUC in 2011. The analysis is based on pre-deforestation 
imagery from 16 August 2010. ‘Canopy cover’ refers to points intersecting with a 
tree crown. ‘Bare Land’ refers to points intersecting with grass or bare land 
(deforestation). ‘No Data’ refers to points lacking data due to clouds, cloud 
shadows, or lack of VHR imagery. 
The case of Sun Biofuels in Kisarawe district, Tanzania, indicates similar 
problems of distributed seeing particularly with regards to the biodiversity 
question. In 2009, the company acquired 8,211 ha through a process which was 
said to displace eleven villages from land that provided livelihoods for about 
11,000 people (Sulle and Nelson, 2009). Using text analysis as a lens, we tried to 
establish qualitatively the differing views of the impact on forest values. According 
to the national press and several NGOs, the area had been uncultivated but used by 
the villagers for charcoal-making, hunting, and collection of firewood, fruits, nuts, 
mushrooms, honey, and herbs, while others pointed to on-going clearance and 
severe degradation including on-going clearance of forest patches for farm land 
(Carrington, 2011; Land Rights Research and Resource Institute, 2011; Oakland 
Institute, 2011; Oxfam-International, 2008).  
Hence, according to some sources the area was already highly degraded 
prior to the biofuel activities, which would most likely not qualify as an FAO 
primary forest. Other sources, however, claim it was the biofuel company and its 
deforestation that caused the loss of biodiversity and of traditional medicine and 
livelihood sources. In addition, the environmental NGO WWF claimed that the few 
patches of natural coastal bushland, grassland, and thickets found in the area most 
likely contained coastal forest endemic plants and animals species, including the 
rare tree Foetidia africana and migrant populations of hunting dog, elephants, and 
lions (Gordon-Maclean et al., 2008). The EU standard does not help to resolve 
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these questions but rather diffuses and distributes it further. NGOs such as WWF 
have not been extended the power to determine biodiversity values, rather the 
question must be deferred to intergovernmental organisations or the IUCN again. 
These kinds of conflicting stories, prioritisation of values, and land rights 
issues are entirely invisible when we ‘see like the EU standard’. Our remote 
sensing methodology is also limited in its ability to establish carbon loss. Our 
analysis indicates that 2,000 ha were deforested after January 2008, which 
represented only a fraction of the total area obtained by Sun Biofuels. However, we 
were not able to measure CCC accurately because only post-LUC imagery was 
available for this area. Instead, we measured the canopy cover of a nearby area 
with a similar spectral signature (close to 30%). Although the comparative data 
cannot be used as evidence, they suggest that carbon values may have been lost, 
and further on the ground investigation is needed to see the actual LUC in this case.  
In the case of BioShape in Kilwa district, Tanzania, we had to move our 
remote sensing to actually see the project. BioShape acquired 34,000 ha for a 
jatropha plantation in 2006, and setting the gaze itself proved the first challenge, as 
the project had been relocated. Just identifying the site on a map required cross-
referencing with WWF-Tanzania, scrutinising company web sources, and 
interviews with the government. The company had initially been allocated an area 
suitable for agriculture but had managed to ‘locally negotiate’ its way into a 
forested area (personal comm. Government representative, January 23, 2013). Our 
EO analysis showed that 145 ha of Miombo woodland had been cleared adjacent to 
the designated project area. The site was deforested in 2008-2009, including areas 
with over 30% in canopy cover.  
Similar to Moçamgalp, this case presents issues that are not captured by the 
EU standard. Various sources claim that BioShape started logging and timber 
processing before receiving a proper permit from the district council (ESD, 2008; 
IPS, 2011; WWF, 2008). The company denied accusations of illegal logging, yet 
referred to a consultancy report establishing that 8-12 m3 of timber/ha had been 
retrieved and used for local construction purposes and to cover land preparation 
costs of the biofuel farm (bioshape.phpwebhosting.com/, accessed November 05, 
2011). BioShape claimed compliance with the EU standard and promised to retain 
forested areas with canopy cover over 30% (WWF-Tanzania, 2008). In our 
understanding, this strategy to cut and compensate is not acceptable within the 
standard. Yet it illustrates how actors may begin to bend the standard optic to 
incorporate financial sustainability aspects, such as to rationalise the harvesting and 
selling of timber to recover land preparation costs. As Scott might say, the local, 
interested, contextual, and historically specific influence here how ‘sustainable 
biofuels’ is perceived and practiced. Though further qualitative research is 
necessary to firmly establish precisely how these social aspects undermine the 
spirit of the EU standard, other rationalities contradict it, particularly if non-
compliant timber harvesting was used to sustain operations under the standard. 
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This challenges the too often taken-for-granted notion that standards reshape 
realities according to plan. Instead, our analysis shows how the standard slips away 
in practice due to our limits to measure things and in the multi-scalar battle 
between rules and authorities. 
In this case, it is possible to trace how the EU standard networks with 
national mechanisms to ‘see’ the potential impacts of LUC. A central node is the 
EIA, which auditors can use to measure baseline environmental values. The EIA 
(EMAC, n.d.) in this case had raised concerns over the amount of Miombo 
woodland that would be clear-cut for the biofuel plantation, including concerns that 
the deforestation would lead to an overall decrease in the GHG balance due to the 
carbon loss associated with the clear felling. Yet the final recommendation was to 
go ahead with the project. The initial EIA was heavily criticized by NGOs and was 
therefore redone. Among the issues raised about the initial EIA were: falsely 
referring to mature coastal forest as degraded; adding an author to the EIA 
reporting process who was not involved in the assessment; failing to acknowledge 
that the forest was listed as one of 21 global biodiversity hotspots; failing to 
address risks to coastal forest endemic species; failing to consider the impacts of 
migration into the area (Fibronot, n.d.; German et al., 2011a; wa Simbeye, 2010; 
WWF-Tanzania, 2008). While the EIA was redone, it nevertheless draws attention 
to the fact that a poorly conducted EIA may undermine the EU standard by ‘hiding’ 
non-compliance as the EIA is often the key source for making biodiversity and 
carbon values legible to auditors. It is by shaping information through these types 
of blurred images – such as poor reports, cloudy images, or wrong sites – that 
technologies contribute to rewriting how sustainable biofuels is seen. Remotely 
sensed or other data are simplified representations, but they also produce new and 
possibly less negative representations of LUC than we can produce through other 
methodologies.  
D1 Oils-BP Fuel Crops in Lukulu district, Zambia, also shows how project 
sustainability comes to matter beyond the standard view. We looked at one of the 
D1 Oils-BP Fuel Crops jatropha projects planned for a 15,000-35,000 ha-sized 
plantation in northern Zambia (interviews; D1 Oils, 2005). Our EO analysis based 
on coordinates, captured during a site visit, shows that deforestation started in April 
2006 and reached 610 ha in 2008. We based this EO analysis only on module 1 and 
2, and interpreted Landsat data in combination with statements from interviews 
with company management, three agricultural officers, and two former local 
managers who resided in the area (site visit, March 2011). The former managers 
affirmed deforestation (651 ha), stating that the cleared area had been ‘virgin’ and 
‘untouched’ forest. Also the agricultural officers made a point of distinguishing 
between the cleared area and nearby forested areas degraded by slash-and-burn 
practices, which contributed to our conclusion that extensive CCC had occurred. 
Even the company director was forthcoming in affirming deforestation. The 
director referred to the cleared area as a scar shaped as tear drop on the border of a 
forest and wild life reserve. 
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In our attempts to qualify the environmental value of the lost forest, the 
limitations of our methodologies were again clear. Just as it is for the EU standard, 
our data is limited by the practices of transnational companies and national 
authorities. An EIA had not been conducted (at least the Environmental Council 
had no record of a full EIA in this case) and accounts were again contradictory. 
The provincial forest authority had no documented evidence on the type of forest 
values that had been lost. The official at the provincial forest department said that 
he was not familiar with the plantation, and, given that he only had access to old 
paper maps of the area, he referred us to digitalised maps available in the capital 
Lusaka. There, the only person with access to the map was out of the office. Rapid 
appraisals commonly used by auditors are similarly challenged by these every-day 
difficulties of establishing LUC, which diffuse what the standard approach can see. 
This case illuminates the fact that site visits may not be sufficient in establishing 
LUC, specifically in green field projects outside of the state administrative grid 
(this project was established on customary land). It also demonstrates that those 
attempting to establish LUC cannot simply arrive and ‘check’ evidence if there has 
been no effort to gather such evidence beforehand. 
By combining our data sets, we estimate that an area with more than 30% of 
the canopy cover was cleared. Yet this LUC is not viewed as unsustainable through 
the standard optic because CCC took place before January 2008. Although LUC 
can be clearly traced back to the biofuel company, the produce can be sold within 
EU as if it did not change the carbon balance. This reminds us that standards are 
governing tools that require technical delineations in time and space. Delineations 
create blind spots not only in reference to events in the past, but also to actions in 
the future in addition to their failure to adequately capture social aspects. 
Interviews with the residents indicated that the loss of forest values was not their 
major concern, for example. Rather, it was the sudden deforestation, termination of 
the project and the loss of jobs that was deemed unsustainable, leaving the area 
bare and short of employment, with the few surviving jatropha plants of little or no 
value to local residents especially when compared with the pre-existing forest. 
Again, project sustainability was an issue which escaped the standard view. 
Summing up these points, seeing like a standard and using EO services is one way 
to establish carbon loss, yet it comes with a range of blind spots, such as losses 
outside the time scope of the standard and project sustainability which are closely 
tied to the question of what is locally defined as sustainable LUC. 
Turning to look at Kenya Jatropha Energy in Dakatcha, Kenya, a 
distributed view is quite revealing. Kenya Jatropha Energy requested a 33-year 
lease to establish a 50,000 ha jatropha plantation in the Dakatcha Woodland which 
international NGOs vehemently protested the project as Dakatcha is classified by 
the NGO BirdLife International as an Important Bird and Biodiversity Area. Other 
sources claim that the area shelters IUCN red-listed and globally endangered 
species (BirdLife, 2010; Hance, 2012; Ng´weno, 2009). Seeing like the standard, 
the IUCN designation would disqualify the land for biofuel production. Attempting 
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to halt LUC, an international NGO conducted a life cycle analysis of the proposed 
project, concluding that emissions from biofuels on this site would be 2.5 to six 
times higher than emissions from energy-equivalent fossil fuels (North Energy, 
2011). Such results also help make legible the unsustainability of the land use for 
the EU market, in reference to the GHG emissions savings required by the EU 
standard. 
This case further conveys how legibility is less straightforward in practice. 
The biodiversity status and carbon calculations mentioned above are open to 
debate. Dakatcha has no formal protection status, but the boundaries of the 
woodland are unclear and not yet mapped by the relevant institutions (Kenya 
Forest Service et al., n.d.; Ng´weno, 2009). Also, the Woodland is described in 
contradictory ways. It is described as providing local communities with grazing 
grounds, wild fruits, medicinal plants, and firewood. Yet similar to the case of Sun 
Biofuels, accusations of deforestation through (illegal) logging, charcoal making, 
slash-and-burn clearance for agricultural fields, and hunting feature in the 
descriptions of this area (Citizen TV, 2011). In practice, it is possible for auditors 
and companies to read certain facts, leaving alternative facts hidden. This case also 
illustrates how projects can be hidden from a remote view. The location of the 
project was impossible to establish. The coordinates given by the company were 
imprecise and did not match those in the EIA map. Drawing on an analysis of 
written sources, we found that land preparation had occurred along a road and 
within two 10 ha pilot plots. The company affirmed this LUC, and stated that the 
designated area was never cleared due to a dispute (Gitau and Beja, 2010). It is 
noteworthy that this type of smaller sized deforestation outside the prime 
production site may disqualify the produce for the EU market (depending on how 
system boundaries are to be drawn around land used ‘for production’). The 
extended control that the standard partly relies on worked to shut down the project 
in this case. The relevant authorities never issued licenses for this operation (Gari, 
2011). By 2012, the company left the area, and NGOs declared the campaign a 
success and applauded the National Environment Management Agency for 
stopping the project (ActionAid UK, 2011). It is important to note, however, that it 
was not the demand to comply with the EU standard that led to the project shutting 
down. It was national legislation and the activism of NGOs that were important. 
Seeing like a standard on Niqel in Sofala, Mozambique, differs from the 
others in that the company did not target the EU market. We include it here to 
highlight a dimension not captured by the other cases, namely the way different 
standards overlap or contradict each other. The intention of Niqel was to produce 
jatropha oil for domestic markets for which there are no specific regulations on 
deforestation, according to the company director (interview, November 3, 2011). 
The location of the Niqel project area was provided by the director, and our GIS 
analysis shows deforestation of 1,800 ha in three areas. We established baseline 
VHR imagery in two of the three areas: in 2008, the canopy cover was 64% in area 
(a) and 48 % in area (b). Afterwards, the canopy cover was close to zero, which 
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makes sense because the areas were deforested to provide planting space for the 
jatropha plantations, according to interviews. (See figures 4 and 5.) Our CCC 
figures correspond with the figures given by the company that 1,100 ha of jatropha 
had been planted and another 500 ha had been prepared for planting (the total lease 
was 7,500 ha) (company presentation, Biofuel Conference, Mocuba, November 
2011).  
During interviews, the director was forthcoming about the LUC taking 
place, involving statements that deforestation had occurred to an extent that would 
disqualify the jatropha oil according to the EU standard. The Mozambican 
sustainability standard is under development, and as we noted earlier, there are 
discussions to include EU criteria to facilitate the export of Mozambican 
biomaterial and biofuels to EU (Schut et al., 2014). This case illustrates how the 
struggles to define sustainable biofuels are on-going. Sustainability concerns often 
collide in this way, making their sustainability imprint likely to be continuously  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The extent of deforestation in Niqel’s project area in 2011. The figure to 
the left is area (a) and the area to the right is area (b). The analysis is based on pre-
deforestation imagery from 14 July, 2009. ‘Canopy cover’ refers to points 
intersecting with a tree crown. ‘Bare Land’ refers to points intersecting grass or 
bare land (deforestation). ‘No Data’ refers to points lacking data due to clouds, 
cloud shadows or lack of VHR imagery. 
revaluated and as such, fragile. This land use would be defined as unsustainable 
according to the EU, but may be sustainable in terms of rural development and 
income generation as per Mozambican framing (von Maltitz et al., 2014). National 
demands for rural development and jobs had taken precedence in the decision to 
deforest. We cannot draw any conclusions in terms of legality or other social 
issues, as secondary information is lacking. This emphasizes the importance of 
using multiple methods and triangulating data, as well as not drawing any 
conclusions where information does not exist, or assuming that everything must be 
fine (sustainable) because there is no evidence otherwise.  
73 
ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2018, 17(1): 49-87  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Land cover changes in area (b) of the Niqel project. The imagery on top 
is sourced from Google Earth and shows land status on 14 July 2009. The imagery 
below is sourced from Bing maps and shows status on 8 April 2012. 
Case synthesis: diluted and distributed seeing 
Our six cases show that seeing like an EU standard provides a limited but revealing 
view of the sustainability of biofuel production. By putting the LUC and CCC 
criteria into practice, we detected critical loss of carbon values. (See table 2 for an 
overview.) Four out of six companies deforested land for jatropha production; in 
total 3,102 hectares were cleared according to our CCC analysis, resulting in 
significant loss of carbon values. Moçamgalp, Niqel, and BioShape clearly violated 
the standard: the land originally had canopy cover of over 30% and deforestation 
took place after the EU baseline (January 2008). In the case of D1 Oils-BP Fuel 
Crops, we estimated that areas with more than 30% canopy cover had been cleared, 
but this occurred before January 2008, making it compliant with the EU standard, 
despite the significant CCC.  
Our CCC analysis shows that remote sensing can be used to generate pieces 
of evidence regarding certain sustainability aspects of biofuel production, yet it 
remains a partial view. Our qualitative evidence indicates that other issues not seen 
by the EU standard might be equally critical, such as questions of project 
durability, legality and accountability towards rural residents. In our analysis, the 
standard therefore generates what we call a diluted seeing, which prioritises global 
environmental values over local and social aspects. This partial view can both help 
to signal concerns that it may not be able to see, but it also can serve to hide social 
aspects that are of vital importance for people on the ground. For example, in the 
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case of BioShape, controversies over socio-economic, cultural, and legal issues 
went hand in hand with high carbon values. This would suggest that canopy covers 
could serve as an indicator of high forest values, but we caution that this is not 
always the case. In other cases, job creation was valued over the loss of high 
carbon values. It is in these ways that standards can work to delegitimise certain 
LUC that are posited as sustainable by local stakeholders, and vice versa.  
Furthermore, the discrepancies between quantitative and qualitative 
measurements illuminate how sustainability claims are scalar and often partial. 
Looking at large scale projects from a distance, quantitative dimensions of 
deforestation emerge, whereas situating the analysis in local accounts gives more 
focus to qualitative accounts of land rights, legality, and processes of decision-
making, compensation, and overall sustainability of the project in terms of, so to 
speak, sustainable rural development (see e.g. Widengård, 2015). Our cases throw 
these issues into stark relief.  At the time of writing, at least three had been either 
been terminated or had shifted to food production, with no other biofuel companies 
expressing interest in taking over biofuel production on those lands. These issues of 
longevity fall outside of the scope of the EU standard. Looking at biofuels and 
sustainability in broader terms would entail questions of how to ‘pay back’ the 
carbon debt or fulfil the promises given to the rural residents. The cases show that 
the standard is inadequate in terms of protecting land from unsustainable change, in 
part because of how sustainable land use is oversimplified and in part because of 
the time frames and standard practice.  
Secondly, the case analysis contributes to our argument that the distributed 
seeing of the standard view transforms the intention of created standardised 
sustainable biofuels into multiple, uncertain forms. The intention of a homogenous, 
administrative ordering encountered many obstacles and conflicts. Our 
investigation, at times clouded by poor imageries, project relocation, or unclear 
geographical coordinates, proves how difficult it can be to establish what is going 
on.  
Our cases show that distributed seeing is particularly critical to establish 
biodiversity values, due to the lack of previous conservation designations, 
contradictory statements, and unclear boundaries. As we have shown, EO and EIA 
technologies cannot in themselves overcome conflicting claims. Auditors must 
make choices among contradictory claims in key documents, such as EIA; licenses 
issued by local or national governments; permissions granted by local and 
traditional authorities; rules created and enforced by individual land users or user 
representative bodies; and statements by non-governmental organisations.  Our 
analysis thus highlights how national processes, such as assessments and permits, 
are an integral part of understanding the impacts of biofuel projects. As a result, 
environmental valuation requires evaluating the sources of data themselves. 
Thrown into this mix of claims, auditors have a challenging task to rapidly 
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conclude which authority is more reliable. Standards will have to tackle straight on 
the problem of how to establish a ‘truer’ description.  
Furthermore, putting the standard into practice, as we do in this article, 
brings into view how the standard apparatus provokes a mismatch in more ways 
than simply through discursive frames. Satellite imagery becomes one claim among 
others, which can overlap, contradict, or compete with other ways of establishing 
‘truth’. The protection of land and forests, therefore, is more complex than 
protecting carbon and biodiversity through an expert lens. It also involves 
protection of those that speak differently about, or on behalf of, land and other 
natural resources. Our case analysis shows that issues that had been seen by local 
media and NGOs were more likely to be invoked when evaluating whether or not 
standards were being met. It is therefore noteworthy that the standard only extends 
power to certain international organisations and national authorities.  
Table 2: Overview of CCC in relation to EU-RED 17.4(b) and EU-FQD 7b.4(b).  
Project Deforest
ed area 
(ha) 
Canopy 
cover 
status at 
baseline
* 
Method of 
establishing 
CCC 
Time of 
CCC 
Compliance with 
RED 17.4(b) 
FQD 7b.4(b) 
Moçamgalp 547 > 30% GIS 
Interviews 
Observation 
After 
January, 
2008 
No 
Niqel 1800 > 30% GIS 
Interviews 
After 
January, 
2008 
No 
D1 Oils-BP 
Fuel Crops 
610 > 30% GIS  
(only module 
1 and 2) 
Interviews 
Observation 
Before 
January, 
2008 
Yes 
Sun Biofuels Potentiall
y 2000 
No data Document 
analysis 
- Not established 
BioShape 145 > 30% GIS 
Interviews 
After 
January, 
2008 
No 
Kenya 
Jatropha 
Energy 
Potentiall
y 20 
No data Document 
analysis 
- Not established 
* Baseline is set at January 2008 in accordance with EU-RED/FQD.  
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Conclusion 
In this article, we have used the approach of ‘seeing like a standard’ to 
increase our understanding of the processes through which standards make 
sustainable biofuels legible, and how their criteria and control technologies 
contribute to this exercise. Using the EU sustainability standard for biofuels and 
bioliquids as a case, we noted that the standard generates a diffusion of power, 
which both enables and constrains the EU to ‘see’ beyond its borders. Our first 
argument is that the standard mode of governance generates, what we call, ‘diluted 
seeing’, which prioritises global environmental problems, GHG emissions and 
biodiversity loss over broader social and institutional aspects. By combining 
interdisciplinary qualitative and quantitative methodologies, we detected high 
carbon losses due to biofuel projects, but at the same time, the standard skips over 
wider problems related to unsustainable projects. A central argument in earlier 
literature has been that the EU standard does not match the social-ecological reality 
in contexts where biofuel crops are produced (Hunsberger et al., 2013; Larsen et 
al., 2013; Levidow, 2013; Schut et al., 2014). Our analysis contributes to this 
notion, and extends it to show how the standard both reinforces the focus on global 
environmental values (carbon, biodiversity) and at the same time, obscures other 
sustainability aspects which were valued locally (forest livelihoods, legality, long-
term commitments, and plantation jobs). Our analysis evaluated projects using 
criteria in the EU standard and adding some limited qualitative research to show 
how challenging it is to determine the sustainability impacts on communities and 
natures. We found conflicting views. In several cases, both shutting down and 
continuing the biofuel project were regarded sustainable, depending on ones’ stake 
in the project, knowledge, values.  
These findings highlight how defining and creating ‘sustainable biofuels’ 
remains a challenge. It may not be possible to universally standardise an 
understanding of sustainable biofuels. Instead, different standards will contradict 
each other. For example, what appears to have been illegal land use was framed as 
sustainable land use according to the standard adopted by the EU. This suggests 
that conflicts around biofuel operations are partly tied to the ways that the standard 
apparatus dictates what sustainable land use is, potentially leading to further 
conflicts. It contributes to the notion that land is increasingly a multi-scalar contest 
taking place around the land per se, and over authority and control of institutions at 
vast distances from the land itself  (Margulis et al., 2013). Contests over standard 
criteria may take place in Europe, but they also continue around the land itself. 
Standards therefore play a large role in the struggles around land. They authorise 
certain valuation, and play a part in the networks that work across scales to 
accomplish or resist LUC. Proclaiming a universal standard is complicated in this 
case, seeing that countries have different codified laws, measures, customs, 
viewpoints, beliefs and principles of action. Rather than a fixed and standardised 
mode, biofuel governance is constituted by a complex web of multi-actor, multi-
layered, and multi-sited struggle for authority.  
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Struggles for authority tie into our second argument that the standard 
generates distributed seeing. Unlike Scott’s focus on the centralisation of state 
power, we argue that the EU should be understood as a technology of rule that 
diffuses power beyond EU’s territory onto ‘outsourced’ arrangements which 
combine EU benchmarking, member state control, private certification and audit, 
and additional extension of power to a range of authorities positioned within a 
complex of governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental entities and 
their technical devices. Instead of a strong and purposeful state, a more complex 
understanding of the relationships between scientific and political practice emerge 
(Bridge, 2014). The controversy over global biofuel expansion links precisely to 
this extended governance, as large-scale biofuel investments help diffuse hybrid 
forms of state-led, private standards into transnational biofuel geographies, with 
uncertain outcomes for local natures and societies (German, 2012; Margulis et al., 
2013; Sassen, 2013; Sikor et al., 2013). Drawing on Rocheleau (2015), it is critical 
that the networked and distributed power that standards entail is also rooted in the 
desires of local communities, so they can be used to resist or accomplish LUC to 
their benefits. 
Our approach that mixed social, natural and GIS scientists certainly proved 
what Scott calls ‘relative simplicity’. Whereas our GIS expert easily manoeuvred 
these technologies, the simplicity is somewhat lost on us ‘who cannot not break the 
code’ (cf. Scott, 1998, 35). It is not a case of simply comparing qualitative data to 
the EO. Rather, we have had to piece together multiple sources of information and 
to try to wade through different disciplinary languages, techniques for data 
validation and attempt to translate all that to craft the stories here. Extending the 
power of control to technical expertise and complex ‘remote seeing’ is diluting the 
participatory aspect of making sustainability legible.  
Yet it is crucial to remember that the value of the standard to the EU lies in 
its universality. Paraphrasing Scott (1998), its administrative power depends ‘on its 
abstract sketchiness, its lack of detail–its thinness’ (1998, 44). In principle, the EU 
standard can be applied throughout the world, regardless of local context, to 
produce a sustainability profile of the biofuel sold within the EU. Without such 
simplification, there would be a ‘hopelessly bewildering welter of local standards’ 
which do not lend themselves to statistical aggregation that would allow EU and 
member state officials ‘to make meaningful comparisons’ (cf. Scott, 1998, 27). 
However, in practice, our analysis puts into doubt whether governing technologies 
developed in one part of the world are as effective in other contexts (cf. Joseph, 
2009). Remote sensing as well as remote ‘seers’ are constrained by the distanced 
optic to fully recognise local impacts, desires, and wider societal implications. 
Also, given the diversity of economic, social and political arrangements where 
biofuel crops are grown, ‘it is not necessarily desirable to treat each of these 
considerations the same way in all times and places’ (Hunsberger et al., 2013, 245). 
These insights draw into question the merits of various calls for more globalised, 
harmonised standards (cf. Scarlat and Dallemand, 2011). At minimum, they need to 
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be treated with caution. Moreover, our analysis puts in doubt global governance per 
se. Rather, standards generate a wide array of overlapping rules and settings which 
are perhaps not best described as ‘global’  (Ponte et al., 2011a). 
More than anything, sustainable biofuels is the product of hybrid 
governance, which is a far more complex network than the EU standard and its 
approved schemes. The standardised approach will have to tackle straight on the 
outlying issues which continue to challenge the standardised rendering of what 
constitutes sustainable biofuels. Like in Scott’s account, the local, interested, 
contextual, and historically specific influence how ‘sustainable biofuels’ is 
perceived and practiced. Our approach is one step towards revealing these gaps. 
One of the limitations of the present study has been an inability to track the 
evolution of our specific cases and the more performative question of what seeing 
like a standard means in the mesh of rules manifested locally. More empirical 
research is needed, seeing that the EU, member states, private sustainability 
schemes, biofuel operators, third states and local actors continuously update the 
meaning and practice of sustainable biofuels. 
From a distance, it appears as if only one project in our analysis has 
sustained its jatropha interest, specifically the one which never sought to meet the 
EU standard in the first place but which rather prioritised Mozambican jobs and 
rural development. The other five projects abandoned the idea of jatropha biofuels. 
And yet they caused LUC, loss of high carbon values and possibly also biodiversity 
values and food, livelihood and people displacements. Being tied to marketed 
biofuels, seeing like a standard misses these effects, and skips over wider problems 
related to unsustainable projects. It is not an optic of power which deals with 
footloose investments; neither can it reverse any irreversible effects caused. The 
EU policies incentivised biofuel production worldwide, and yet the EU had a 
limited view on how biofuel production would impact the world. All in all, it seems 
that Scott’s advice is still valid, that is, to take small steps, favour reversibility, plan 
on surprise, and hope that the involved actors can develop their experiences and 
insights to improve on the design (Scott, 1998, 345). 
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